Privacy has become an increasingly important issue in data mining. In this paper, we consider a scenario in which a data miner surveys a large number of customers to learn classification rules on their data, while the sensitive attributes of these customers need to be protected. Solutions have been proposed to address this problem using randomization techniques. Such solutions exhibit a tradeoff of accuracy and privacy: the more each customer's private information is protected, the less accurate result the miner obtains; conversely, the more accurate the result, the less privacy for the customers.
from vast amounts of data, is playing an increasingly important role in the current world. However, data mining, given its power in knowledge discovery, can be misused to violate people's privacy if proper measures are not taken. Privacy concerns have become one of the top priorities in technical, business, and political discussions of data mining. Due to these concerns, when customer data is collected from a large population, many people may decide to give false information, or simply decline to provide any information. Applying data-analysis tools and knowledge-discovery tools to data collected in this manner can therefore produce results with unacceptably low accuracy. This is in spite of the fact that, assuming privacy is properly protected, many people say they are willing to provide correct information in exchange for certain benefits the miner gives based on the result of mining [Wes99] . For example, a survey conducted to understand Internet customers' attitudes towards privacy showed that only 27% respondents say they are willing to provide their data without protection of privacy [Cra99] . Consequently, providing privacy protection measures may be critical to the success of data collection, and to the success of the entire task of data mining.
In this paper, we consider a "fully distributed" setting, in which each of many customers hold their own data. Existing solutions [AS00, AA01, ESAG02, EGS03, RH02, DZ03] to the privacy problem in this setting depend on randomization of each customer's data, which induces a tradeoff between privacy and accuracy: the more privacy of each customer has, the more accuracy the miner loses in his result. While in some cases the tradeoff may simultaneously offer sufficient privacy and sufficient accuracy, it is more desirable to have solutions that are both fully private and fully accurate. It has been demonstrated that in many cases random data distortion preserves very little privacy [KDWS03] . Related work on confidentiality in statistical databases [AW89, DN03, DN04] and random response techniques [War65, AJL04] also give nice discus-sions of randomization of data.
In contrast, cryptographic solutions to privacypreserving data mining that provide strong privacy have been proposed [LP02, VC02, VC03, KC02, WY04] , but these tend to do so at a high performance cost. In particular, in order to have efficiency that is reasonable (say, linear in the size of the "virtual" database), these solutions require the data to be shared among only a small number of parties, often just two parties. In addition, these solutions typically require multiple rounds of communication between the participants.
In this work, we consider the fully distributed setting described above. Each customer maintains her own data. This can be thought of a horizontally partitioned database in which each transaction is owned by a different customer. A data miner wishes to compute some data mining results based on the customer data. In some applications, the data miner may also have some additional information about each customer. Note that the fully distributed setting can inherently provide more customer privacy than a horizontal partition into a small number of partitions, as each customer retains full control of her data in the fully distributed setting.
We propose a new approach that provides cryptographically strong privacy for each customer, but does not lose any accuracy as a cost of privacy, and is very efficient even in the fully distributed setting. In particular, we consider a scenario in which a miner surveys a large number of customers to learn classification rules by mining the set of collected data. In this scenario, we assume each customer is willing to provide her data to the miner as long as the privacy-sensitive part of her data is protected. By adding the efficient cryptographic operations we propose, we can prove that each customer's privacy is protected in a strong cryptographic sense.
1.1 Related WorkWe note that our scenario is similar to the scenario of electronic voting [BT94] . However, e-voting systems usually assume that the voting authority consists of a group of servers that are thresholdtrusted, or that another authority independent from the voting authority also participates in the protocol. Both of these possibilities are not justifiable in our scenario, however. Another difference is that in our setting, additional specialized concerns in e-voting such as receiptfreedom of the protocol are not an issue.
We also note that [AJL04] uses cryptography in the randomization setting to ensure that participants properly follow their specified instructions about randomization. However, their solution still has a privacy/accuracy tradeoff; in contrast, we use cryptography to "break" the privacy/accuracy tradeoff. Yet another piece of related work is [KV02] , which proposes a general architecture for privacy-preserving data mining. But their approach needs multiple service providers that do not collude with each other, which may not be available in practice.
In the context of privacy-preserving data mining, recent work gives privacy-preserving solutions for mining a naive Bayes classifier across a database horizontally or vertically partitioned into a small number of partitions [KV03, VC04] . In contrast, our solution provides a privacy-preserving method for mining a naive Bayes classifier in a fully distributed setting where each customer holds one record.
1.2 Our ContributionOur key technical contribution is a privacy-preserving method that allows a data miner to compute frequencies of values or tuples of values in the customers' data, without revealing the privacy-sensitive part of the data. Technically, this can be reduced to a problem of securely summing private inputs and thus in theory it can be solved by either a general-purpose protocol for secure multiparty computation, e.g. [Yao86, GMW87, BGW88] , or a special-purpose protocol for the secure sum problem, e.g. [Sch96, Chapter 6]. However, our solution has a number of advantages over the existing general-purpose protocols:
• Our solution is very efficient, while the existing general-purpose protocols are prohibitively expensive.
• Our solution does not assume any communication channels between customers and so is superior in the fully distributed scenario, where it would be infeasible to require such channels.
• In our solution, only one round of interaction is needed between the miner and each customer. This brings great convenience to the data mining task, since the customers can "submit data and go."
To illustrate the power of our proposed approach, we take naive Bayes classification as an example and enable a privacy-preserving learning algorithm to protect customers' privacy using our privacy-preserving frequency mining computation. We also suggest other privacypreserving algorithms that are enabled by joint frequencies, such as decision trees and association rule mining.
Cryptographic techniques are often dismissed as being too expensive to use in practical data mining applications. Indeed, performance measured from implementations of cryptographic data mining protocols have often corroborated this impression [SWY04] . However, some cryptographic solutions are very efficient, and 2 their performance may be good enough to be useful in practice. We have implemented our privacy-preserving frequency mining algorithm and our privacy-preserving naive Bayes classifier learning algorithm, and show that both have very reasonable overhead.
We present our privacy-preserving joint frequency algorithm, including experimental results, in Section 2. We apply joint frequencies to naive Bayes classification in Section 3, again including experimental results. We discuss the application of the frequency algorithm to decision trees and association rule mining in Section 4, and we conclude in Section 5.
Privacy-Preserving Frequency Mining
This section describes a privacy-preserving primitive for frequency mining. In Section 2.1, we formulate the problem of frequency mining. We state our privacy definition in Section 2.2, and present our privacy-preserving protocol for frequency mining in Section 2.3. We give a security proof for this protocol in Section 2.4 and provide experimental results in Section 2.5. • Each customer only sends one flow of communication to the miner; there is no further interaction between the customer and the miner.
• No customer communicates with other customers.
We call this the reduced interaction model. Solutions in this model are highly practical because they do not need communication channels between different customers or multi-round interaction between any customer and the miner.
In addition, we require that each customer's d i is protected as defined in Section 2.2.
2.2 Definition of PrivacyIn the context of the randomization approach of protecting data privacy, there are two approaches to quantify the privacy-preserving property of a randomization methods. One approach relies on information theory [AA01] , the other approach is based on the notion of privacy breaches [ESAG02, EGS03] . In the context of the cryptographic approach, the definition of privacy can be derived from the general definition of security in multi-party computations [Gol04] . Our definition of privacy given below, for example, can be viewed as a simplification of the general definition in the semi-honest model, where the simplification results from our reduced interaction model. In our definition, we consider the possibility that some corrupted customers might share their information with the miner in order to help derive the private information of honest customers. We require that no extra information about the honest customers' values be leaked even if the miner above receives such help from corrupted customers. In the following definition, we do not consider problem of customers sharing their information with each other since, as we discuss after the definition, this will not give them any additional information in the reduced interaction model. 
(1)
Here, c ≡ denotes computational indistinguishability (see a standard book of cryptography, e.g., [Gol04] , for a definition), and {view miner,
)} is the joint view (again, see [Gol04] for a precise definition) of the miner and the t corrupted customers, {U i } i∈I . Intuitively, this definition states that a polynomial-time algorithm M , called a simulator , can simulate what the miner and the corrupted customers have observed in the protocol using only the final result d, the corrupted users' knowledge, and the public keys. Therefore, the miner and the corrupted customers jointly learn nothing beyond d.
Definition 1 only addresses privacy in the semihonest model [Gol04] (which assumes that all parties follow the protocol). However, in our reduced interaction model, a protocol protecting customer privacy in the semi-honest model actually also protects customer privacy even when the miner and the corrupted customers are fully malicious (i.e., may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol). This is because these malicious parties cannot have any influence on the honest customers due to the restrictions of the reduced interaction model. In this sense, our solution provides privacy against malicious parties "for free". We note, however, that the correct completion of the protocol cannot be guaranteed with malicious parties, as they may send garbage or refuse to send anything at all.
2.3 ProtocolOur protocol design is based on the additively homomorphic property of a variant of ElGamal encryption, which has been used in, e.g., [HS00] . The privacy of our protocol is based on the believed computational difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem, and the related ElGamal cryptosystem, which we will describe in more detail in Section 2.4. The protocol itself uses the mathematical properties of exponentiation, which allows the miner to combine encrypted results received from the customers into the desired sums.
Let G be a group in which discrete logarithm is hard, and let g be a generator of G. All computations in this section are carried out in the group G. Suppose that each customer U i has two pairs of keys:
The values x i and y i are private keys (i.e., each x i and y i is known only to customer U i ); X i and Y i are public keys (i.e., they can be publicly known). In particular, the protocol requires that all customers know the values X and Y . In addition, each customer knows the group G and the common generator g. Recall that each customer U i holds the Boolean value d i , and the miner's goal is to
The privacy-preserving protocol for the miner to learn d is detailed in Figure 1 . Proof : We show that, in the protocol, when the miner finds g d = r, the value d is the desired sum. Suppose
2.4 Privacy AnalysisNext, we establish our privacy guarantee based on a standard cryptosystem-the ElGamal encryption scheme. In this encryption scheme, to encrypt a message α using public key X, we compute
where k is chosen uniformly at random in [0, q − 1]. It has been shown in [TY98] (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions) the ElGamal encryption scheme is secure in the sense of semantic security (see, e.g., [GM84] for the definition of semantic security). Informally, the notion of semantic security means that whatever the attacker could compute from the ciphertext the attacker could compute without ciphertext, then attacker learns nothing new by seeing ciphertext. Our protocol makes use of a homomorphic property of a modified version of ElGamal. Specifically, if the message α is changed to g α before encrypting, then from encryptions (g
of α 1 and α 2 , respectively, then it is possible to derive an encryption of
). In our protocol, the message m i sent by customer U i is equivalent to the first part of an ElGamal encryption of d i under a private key ( x i )y i , while the message h i is the second part is part of an ElGamal encryption of d i under private key ( y i )x i . Together, all the customer 4 messages are combined by the miner to be an encryption of g d . In order to undo the resulting encryption, the miner must first, in its first step, decrypt to learn r, which is g d , and then since even the miner cannot take discrete logarithms, the miner must use trial and error to learn d. Since the range of possible values of d is not too large, this use of trial and error is feasible.
In the following, we show that our protocol protects each customer's privacy (even if there are up to n − 2 users colluding with the miner) as long as the ElGamal encryption scheme is secure. Throughout the rest of this paper, we take the semantic security of ElGamal encryption as an assumption. Proof : For honest customers' privacy, clearly it suffices to consider the case with the maximum number (n − 2) of corrupted customers. Since our protocol is symmetric in customer indices, without loss of generality we assume that I = {3, 4, . . . , n}. Recall that, to prove the protocol protects customer privacy, we need to construct a simulator M that can generate an ensemble indistinguishable from the miner and the corrupted customers' view using only the final result d, the corrupted users' knowledge, and the public keys. Given this simulator algorithm, we can state that the miner and the corrupted customers jointly learn nothing beyond d.
Instead of describing the entire simulator in detail, we give an algorithm that computes the view of the miner and the corrupted customers in polynomial time using only d, corrupted customers' knowledge, public keys, and some ElGamal encryptions. Under the assumption that the ElGamal encryption is semantically secure, we already know that each ElGamal ciphertext can be simulated. Therefore, combining our algorithm with a simulator for ElGamal ciphertexts, we obtain a complete simulator.
Below is the algorithm that computes the view of the miner and the corrupted customers. It takes four encryptions as its input:
. Then it computes m 1 , m 2 by the computation:
It computes h 1 , h 2 by the computation:
completing the proof.
We note that the security of ElGamal encryption depends on new random values being used for each encryption. In our setting, this means that the x i and y i values, and associated X and Y , cannot be reused in different uses of the protocol. However, since these parameters do not depend on the actual data values, they can in general be precomputed off-line before the protocol starts. In particular, if the protocol is to be run many times, many sets of values could be precomputed in advance so that only a single phase of key distribution is required.
Experimental Results of Frequency Mining
We implemented our privacy-preserving frequency mining algorithm in C, using the OpenSSL libraries for the cryptographic operations. We ran a series of experiments on a PC with a 1GHz processor and 512MB memory under NetBSD. In our experiments, the length of each cryptographic key is 512 bits. We measured the computing time of the privacy-preserving frequency mining protocol for different numbers of customers, from 2, 000 to 10, 000.
To set up for the privacy-preserving frequency mining protocol, the key-generation time for each customer is 4.2 seconds. Computing the protocol parameters X and Y for 10, 000 customers takes 140 milliseconds. As previously noted, these values can precomputed off-line before the protocol starts.
In the privacy-preserving frequency mining protocol, it takes each customer to prepare her message to the miner only 1 millisecond, as it requires just a single modular exponentiation. The miner's computation is somewhat longer, but still quite efficient. Figure 2 shows the times the miner uses to compute one frequency for different numbers of customers. For example, for 10, 000 customers, the miner's computation takes 146 milliseconds. As these results demonstrate, the privacypreserving frequency mining protocol is very efficient.
Protecting Customer Privacy in Learning
Naive Bayes Classifier The primitive of frequency mining is simple, but is very useful in data mining applications. Correspondingly, our privacy-preserving frequency mining solution is also quite simple, but is potentially useful whenever privacy is a top concern. In this section, we demonstrate the power of our primitive by showing a privacypreserving naive Bayes classifier computation in the fully distributed setting (which can be thought of a horizontally partitioned database in which each record is held by a different party).
Naive Bayes Learning with Privacy ConcernsNaive
Bayes classifiers have been used in many practical applications. They greatly simplify the learning task by assuming that attributes are independent given the class. Although independence of attributes is an unrealistic assumption, naive Bayes classifiers often compete well with more sophisticated models, even if there is modest correlation between attributes. Naive Bayes classifiers have significant advantages in terms of simplicity, learning speed, classification speed, and storage space. They have been used, for example, in text classification and medical diagnosis [DP97, Mit97] . In (non-private) naive Bayes learning, the miner is given a set of training examples. We assume that each example is an attribute vector of a customer together with her class label. From these examples the miner learns a classifier that can be used to classify new instances.
In this paper, we consider the following scenario: there are m attributes, (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m ), and one class attribute V . Without loss of generality, we assume that each attribute A i (1 < i < m) has a domain of {a (1) , . . . , v (p) }. We also assume that there are n customers (U 1 , . . . , U n ), where each customer U j has a vector denoted by (a j1 , . . . , a jm , v j ) . In the customer's vector, (a j1 , . . . , a jm , v j ) is an instance of the attributes vector (A 1 , . . . , A m ) and v j is U j 's class label. In our problem, these data are the training samples from which the miner learns the classifier without learning the samples themselves. The miner surveys all customers for values based on their data, and constructs a classifier to classify a new instance by selecting the most likely class label v:
where (a 1 , . . . , a m ) is the attributes vector of the new instance.
To learn the naive Bayes classifier, traditionally the miner collects all customers' data into one central site, and then learns the classifier at that cental site. In our setting, there is a set S of privacy-sensitive attributes where S ⊆ A. Formally, for any j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, U j is not willing to reveal any information about (a ji ) i∈S to the miner; but she is willing to reveal to the miner all the remaining non-sensitive attribute values (a ji ) i∈{1,...,n}−S . To protect customers' privacy and also enable learning classifier, we design a privacypreserving protocol for naive Bayes learning.
A Privacy-preserving Protocol for Naive
Bayes LearningWe use the primitive for frequency mining in Section 2 as a building block to design a privacy-preserving protocol for naive Bayes learning. In this protocol the miner knows the schema of customer data. Without loss of generality, we assume all customers' sensitive attributes need to be protected. We have two goals to achieve:
• Correctness: the miner learns the naive Bayes classifier accurately.
• Privacy: the miner learns nothing about each customer's sensitive data except the knowledge derivable from the naive Bayes classifier itself.
To achieve these two goals, we first rewrite (8) as:
where #(v ( ) ) (#(a i , v ( ) ), resp.) denotes the frequency, or number of occurrences, of attribute value v ( ) (attribute pair value (a i , v ( ) ), resp.) in all customers' data. To learn the classifier, all the miner needs to do is to learn #(v ( ) ) and #(a i , v ( ) ) can be denoted by a Boolean value, we can use the primitive presented in Section 2. A detailed specification of the protocol is given in Figure 3 . 3.3 Protocol AnalysisIn the following theorem, we implicitly assume that the output classifier is encoded in such a way that it contains the frequencies #(v ( ) ) and #(a
Theorem 3.1. The protocol for naive Bayes learning presented in Figure 3 protects each customer's sensitive data against the miner and up to n − 2 corrupted customers.
Proof : Since all the frequency computations are done independently, the theorem follows immediately from Theorem 2.2.
For accuracy, we compare our privacy-preserving protocol with a traditional naive Bayes learning algorithm running on all customers' data without protection of privacy. Suppose that the learning algorithm without privacy protection outputs a classifier c and that our privacy-preserving protocol outputs c . We claim c = c , which means our protocol does not lose any accuracy as a cost of privacy. Proof : This is straightforward from our protocol specification. Our protocol counts each #(v ( ) ) and each
It uses the privacypreserving method we presented in Section 2 to count each #(a
Since the method in Section 2 computes frequencies precisely, our protocol outputs exactly the same classifier as a non-privacypreserving naive Bayes algorithm.
Overhead Analysis Recall that there are n customers and m attributes and that each (non-class) attribute has a domain of size d, and the class label has a domain of size p. Also recall that the set of privacy-sensitive attributes is S. Assume s = |S| is the number of sensitive attributes. It is easy to see that each customer has a computational overhead-as compared to a nonprivate solution-of dps ElGamal encryptions. In data mining applications, we usually have n dps; thus the computational overhead for each customer is small. The computation overhead for the miner is O(dpsn) modular exponentiations, which is also reasonable. The communication overhead is dpsn ciphertexts.
Experimental Results of Bayes Classifier
LearningThe basic experimental set-up is the same here as described in Section 2.5. The Bayes classifier learning algorithm is implemented in C, and uses the frequency mining implementation as a subroutine. Again, we ran a series of experiments on a PC with a 1GHz processor and 512MB memory under NetBSD, using 512 bit cryptographic keys. For the Bayes clas- sifier experiments, we assumed that each customer has ten attributes, that each attribute has eight nominal values, and that there are two classes. We measured the computation time of each customer and the miner in our privacy-preserving protocol for Bayes classifier learning. Our results show that each customer needs only 120 milliseconds to compute her message flow to the miner. Figure 4 shows the computation times the miner needs to learn a naive Bayes classifier for different numbers of customers. For example, when the number of customers is 10, 000, the miner's computation requires only 22 seconds. Figure 5 further studies how the server's learning time changes when both the customer number and the attribute number vary. In this experiment, we fix the domain size of each non-class attribute to four and the domain size of the class attribute to two. 
Extension to Other Data Mining Algorithms
We describe how our privacy-preserving frequency computation can be used for other important data mining algorithms in the fully distributed model. In Section 4.1, we describe a privacy-preserving ID3 decision tree learning algorithm. In Section 4.2, we sketch a privacypreserving association rule mining algorithm. Both algorithms are in the fully distributed model without loss of accuracy. Both of them leak no information about the customer data beyond the computed frequencies. Both can be efficient even if the number of customers (transactions) is very large. However, both require certain parameters (such as the number of attributes) are small, as they require exponential computation in those parameters, as we discuss further below.
Privacy-Preserving Learning of ID3 Trees
Using our privacy-preserving frequency primitive, we can learn ID3 trees in the fully distributed setting without loss of accuracy. Solutions such as [AS00] can be used in the fully distributed setting, but they lose some accuracy as cost of privacy; solutions such as [LP02] do not lose accuracy for privacy, but they do not work in the fully distributed setting.
The miner's algorithm has the same complexity as the original ID3 tree algorithm, except for an additional linear overhead factor whose value is determined by the ElGamal key size used. However, the computation time of each customer is exponential on the domain size of her attribute. Therefore, our algorithm is efficiently applicable only if the attribute domains are small.
We define the problem of privacy-preserving learning of ID3 decision trees as PPLID3: In the PPLID3 problem, each customer has a (m + 1)-tuple of data in which there are m non-class attributes and one class attribute. The schema of customer data and the domain of each attribute are assumed to be publicly known. Our solution is in the reduced interaction model: each customer sends only a single message flow to the data miner, and there is no further communication. Hence, if customer i sends E i to the miner, the security goal is that the miner learns nothing (beyond the computed frequencies) about customer i's data from E i .
First, we give a brief review of ID3 decision trees. (See [Mit97] for additional details.) An ID3 tree is a rooted tree containing nodes and edges. Each internal node is a test node and corresponds to an attribute. The edges going out of a node correspond to the possible values of that attribute. The ID3 algorithm works as follows. The tree is constructed top-down in a recursive fashion. At the root, each attribute is tested to determine how well it alone classifies the samples. The "best" attribute is then chosen and the samples are partitioned according to this attribute. The ID3 algorithm is then recursively called for each child of this node, using the corresponding subset of data.
Next, we review how the ID3 algorithm chooses the best attribute for a node. We use the following notation. Let A = {A i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} be the set of (non-class) attributes, V the class attribute, and T the set of samples (or records). For simplicity, we assume that all attributes have the same domain size d: Unlike naive Bayes classification, which assumes independence between non-class attributes given the class label, attributes are interdependent with ID3. If the class attribute has p class labels, and each of the m non-class attributes has a domain of size d, then the number of joint frequencies that need to be counted is exponential in m. In some cases we have small m and d and thus we can still achieve reasonable overhead. For example, the data set of Car Evaluation Database from UCI repository [BM98] has six nominal attributes: buying, maint, doors, persons, lug boot and safety, and the class attribute has a domain of size four. For such a scenario, we estimate that each customer needs only one minute to compute her message flow to the miner. Another example [Mit97, Ch. 3 ] is a weather data set containing four data attributes: outlook, temperature, humidity, and windy, and a class attribute, play. If each customer holds one weather record, we estimate that each customer needs only about 0.5 seconds to compute her message flow to the miner.
Association Rule
MiningThe mining of association rules can be formulated as follows. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i m } be a set of items. Let D denote a set of n transactions (or records), where each transaction T is a subset of D. Associated with each transaction is a unique identifier. We say that a transaction T contains P if P ⊂ T . An association rule is an implication of the form P ⇒ Q, where P ⊂ I, Q ⊂ I, and P ∩ Q = ∅. The rule P ⇒ Q has support s in D if s% of the transactions in D contain P ∩ Q. P ⇒ Q holds with c confidence if c% transactions in D that contain P also contain Q.
Association rule mining can be reduced to computing the frequency of a number of particular sets. Using the privacy-preserving frequency mining protocol in Section 2, we enable the miner to compute the frequency of any set of items from customer response. From these, the miner can learn all association rules. Note that this leaks all the computed frequencies to the miner, rather than only revealing the actual frequent itemsets.
In the fully distributed setting, each customer has a transaction. The miner wants to learn the association rules based the customer data, but each customer does not want to reveal her data to the miner. Consider a small example in which P = {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } and Q = {q 1 , q 2 }. We describe how to compute confidence and support for the rule P ⇒ Q. Each customer sends the encryptions of the occurrences of {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , q 1 , q 2 }, {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } and {q 1 , q 2 }. By applying the privacypreserving frequency-mining protocol, the miner can easily learn the confidence and support from customers' output. To learn all association rules with threshold of c and s on D, each customer must compute all possible combinations of the occurrence of sets of items, which is of course exponential on the size m of the item domain. Hence, the solution is only practical if m n.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving method of frequency mining and applied it to naive Bayes learning in a fully distributed setting. If this problem is solved using randomization techniques, then there is a trade-off between privacy and accuracy. However, our proposed solution enjoys cryptographically strong privacy without losing any accuracy as cost of privacy. Furthermore, both theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the method itself and its application to naive Bayes learning are very efficient. Our work assumes that the data are horizontally partitioned such that each customer holds a row. Therefore, an immediate open question is whether a solution similar to ours can be found for the case in which the data are fully vertically partitioned among different parties. We also discussed other possible applications of the proposed privacy-preserving frequency mining: privacy-preserving learning of ID3 trees and association rule mining. These are very practical in some cases, but rely on certain parameters being small. A second open question is whether those applications can be made as efficient as our privacy-preserving protocol for naive Bayes learning. We conjecture that additional techniques are needed to make such protocols efficient.
A third open question is whether it is possible to combine our method with randomization techniques to further improve efficiency. For example, is there a protocol for frequency mining or naive Bayes learning that is more efficient than the one presented in this paper, but still enjoys full privacy and does not lose any accuracy? Alternately, it may be possible to combine some randomization techniques with some cryptographic techniques to further improve the efficiency while the resulting loss of privacy can be quantified and thus limited to an acceptable extent. We believe these questions are worth further investigation.
